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The rise of China has undeniably transformed the global economic landscape. Almost
like an unstoppable force, the world is leaning heavily on the communist juggernaut’s
blistering growth to underpin the global post-Lehman financial recovery. In 'Red
Capitalism: The fragile financial foundation of China’s extraordinary rise', however,
authors Carl E. Walter and Frasier J.T. Howie sound off warning bells.
Both experts on the Chinese banking and securities sector, Walter and Howie drew
on their investment banking experiences to examine the system and foundation on
which China's economy was built. Walter, a long time resident of Beijing, played a
major role in China’s overseas IPOs while Howie, who now resides in Singapore,
worked in sales and trading at China International Capital Corporation.
Back in 1974, China could barely afford to fly then vice-premier (and future
paramount leader) Deng Xiaoping to attend a United Nations conference. The
country has since produced an economic miracle, launching six of the 15 largest
initial public offerings to date. As of March this year, the world’s most populous
country has accumulated more than US$3 trillion worth of foreign exchange reserves.
This colossal turn was the inspiration for Red.
The authors noted that research was based only on publicly available information. Still, they do a neat job of cutting
through the clutter and navigating the labyrinth that is China's financial system.
Big Four Bangs
China began its journey of financial reform and liberalisation under Deng, who was restored to power in 1978, two
years after the death of Mao. With the view that “capitalism wasn’t just for capitalists”, it paved the way for the
next generation of leaders, then president Jiang Zemin and premier Zhu Rongji, to bring financial reform to its logical
conclusion, that is, free and open markets.
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were set up in 1990. Four years later, laws were passed leading to the
creation of an independent central bank. With that, the groundwork for the commercialisation and independence for
the 'Big Four' – the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China and the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China – began.
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 catalysed the recapitalisation and restructuring of organisation and balance sheets
based on international norms. Four “bad” banks were created to take on bad loans so as to complement the Big
Four, which were then partnered with leading global financial institutions. It was a heady period between 2005 and
2006, when the banks raised some US$40 billion in new capital with their IPOs in Shanghai and Hong Kong, amid
scenes of retail Hong Kong investors invading their brokerages for a chance to own a stake in these institutions.
The more important rising stars were the ‘National Champions’ – leading state-owned enterprises (SOE) that are
usually dominant players in their respective industries. “It is not an exaggeration to say that Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley made China’s state-owned corporate sector what it is today,” the authors wrote.
In 1993, Zhu took the Hong Kong Stock Exchange chief executive's suggestion to list selected SOEs on overseas
stock markets, believing that the rigours of international legal, accounting and financial standards would boost
management performance. However, the targeted industries were fragmented and lacked economies of scale.
In the case of China Mobile, Goldman Sachs created a shell company to consolidate the many provincial telecom
authorities and sold it on as a package to international investors. Similar restructuring happened for other selected
SOEs, transforming them into modern corporations before listing on the stock exchanges. Lest one be so mistaken as
to believe that these companies were “public”, the authors would remind readers that majority ownership and control
still resides with the Communist Party. Only minority stakes were sold.  
Families’ business
By most measures, China was progressing well with its financial reform. Zhou Xiaochuan, Zhu’s principal architect in
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the financial reforms and governor of the central bank, People’s Bank of China (PBOC), enjoyed the strong support of
Jiang, who still held the powerful post of China Military Commission's chairman, and Huang Ju, vice-premier in charge
of finance.
Besides creating the Chinese bond market, Zhou, governor of PBOC since 2002 and a doctorate holder from Tsinghua
University, delinked the renminbi, the country’s currency from its previous peg to the US dollar. He also introduced
bank reforms, leading to its successful IPOs.
By 2003, political infighting among the various factions weighed down on growth. The reforms obviously could not
bring about universal benefits, and new leadership, sympathetic to the growing income disparities and social
problems arising, gained more clout. Perhaps more importantly, Zhou’s moves had intruded into the territories of the
other “silos of authority”. With the retirement of Jiang and the demise of Huang due to sickness, the State Council
scaled back Zhou’s initiatives, restoring power across the bureaucracies. This in turn led to a piecemeal rather than
a comprehensive approach to reform.
The writers attributed these failures to the fragmented structure of China’s political system, namely, the special
interest groups coexisting within the monolith that is the Communist Party. “What moves this structure is not a
market economy and its laws of demand and supply, but a carefully balanced social mechanism built around the
particular interests of the revolutionary families who constitute the political elite. China is a family-run business”,
they wrote.
So while many SOEs have taken on the form of Western corporations, with listings on major stock exchanges and all,
they still rely on a system of patronage where the Party appoints its leaders and may meddle at will.
Big Fours and the locals
With the Big Four holding 43% of China’s total financial assets, the reach of these four banks extends beyond just
the financial system. In fact, the authors go as far as to describe that “the Big Four banks form the very core of the
Party’s political power; that they work in a closed system with risk and valuation managed by political fiat” where
“the Party treats its banks as basic utilities that provide unlimited capital to the cherished state-owned
enterprises”. 
The SOEs, in turn, return the favour by stumping up the capital for these banks’ mega-IPOs, with some leakages
allowing other foreign and domestic investors to come along on the ride or a token piece of the action. Practically all
financial risks throughout the system are concentrated on the banks’ balance sheet, with China’s savers underwriting
this risk since they are the only significant source of capital within the system.
This is nowhere clearer than in the primary market for corporate debt where bond prices are set with reference to
bank loans, which in turn references the risk free cost of capital, rather than reflecting true demand which adjusts
for risk. With banks being the dominant underwriters of all bonds, they also hold these bonds in their investment
accounts until maturity – just like loans. 
While debt held by the central-government, as defined by obligations of the Ministry of Finance, would account for
less than 20% of GDP, this deceptively healthy view ignores off-balance sheet obligations of the “near-sovereign
entities” like local governments. “While no one knows the true amount of local-government debt in China (the
banking regulator most certainly does not)… the scale of such debt is as vast as the country it finances”, writes the
authors, who estimate that China’s public debt runs at an extremely high 76% of GDP.
Same words, different meanings
Perhaps more troubling is how the system trades almost entirely with itself. The writers argue that “China’s banks
operate within a comfortable cocoon woven by the Party and produce vast, artificially induced profits that redound
handsomely to the same Party.”
Given their opportunity to profit themselves, SOEs do not want change nor do they want the disciplining hand of
foreign participation. The writers allege that “it suits China’s powerful interest groups to have a complex yet primitive
financial system in which money frequently change hands. Multiple products, regulators, markets and rules all
disguise the origin and destination of China’s massive cash flows. In this business environment, the National
Champions, their family associates and other retainers plunder the country’s large domestic markets and amass huge
profits.”
The writers warn that “one cannot simply assume that words such as ‘stocks’ or ‘bonds’ or ‘capital’ or ‘yield curves’
or ‘markets’ have the same meaning in China’s economic and political context” than that understood in international
finance. They highlight the need to look beyond the curtain to glimpse the rot beneath and discern the true flows of
capital in this so-called economic miracle.
For the legions of staunch cheerleaders of this megatrend called China, Walter and Howie’s views might seem oddly
contrarian. One might even say that they have been overly pessimistic with China's vibrant economy that leads
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rather than takes its cue from the more developed markets. The writers themselves qualified that that they are not
portraying a picture of impending collapse but instead are explaining why prospects for a full liberalisation of the
economy might not be so, given the conflicts of interests that would prevent any further meaningful reform from
proceeding.
The issues raised by the authors certainly deserves some consideration for investors, as to whether the Chinese
markets are indeed so unique that they can operate with a “Red Capitalism” set of rules that are different from other
international markets.
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